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Comments and Casenotes
Successive Criminal Trials In The State Courts
As A Due Process Problem
Hoag v. New Jersey' and Ciucci v. Illinois2
In the Hoag case, the defendant was indicted and tried
for the robbery of three persons in a bar. For some reason,
a fourth and fifth victim were not included in the indict-
ments. The defendant was acquitted of the charges, then
subsequently indicted and tried for the robbery of the
fourth victim. On substantially the same evidence as at
the first trial, defendant was convicted. He appealed, claim-
ing among other things, 4 that the second trial constituted
a denial of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution. The conviction
was affirmed by the Supreme Court of New, Jersey in a
four to three decision. 5 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari,6 and in affirming the conviction, held
that defendant's conviction by the state court at the second
trial was not:
".. . so arbitrary or lacking in justification that it
amounted to a denial of those concepts constituting
'the very essence of a scheme of ordered justice, which
is due process'."'7
Mr. Chief Justice Warren dissented.8 Mr. Justice Douglas,
'356 U.S. 464 (1958).
2356 U.S. 571 (1958).
8State v. Hoag, 21 N.J. 496, 122 A. 2d 628 (1956), dis. op. 634. The dis-
senting opinion, 635, observed that:
"The county prosecutor was at a loss on the oral argument to explain
the omission at the outset to return an indictment for the robbery of
[the fourth victim] . . . ." (Bracketed material added).
'The defendant's case was built around the doctrine of collateral estoppel,
infra, circa p. 129 et 8eq.
9 Supra, n. 3.
'352 U.S. 907 (1956).
7Hoag v. State, 356 U.S. 464, 470 (1958).
'Mr. Chief Justice Warren dissenting, supra, n. 1, di8. op. 473, 477, said:
"The verdict was in petitioners favor. The trial was free of error. To
convict petitioner by litigating this issue again before 12 differentjurors is to employ a procedure that fails to meet the standard re-
quired by the Fourteenth Amendment."
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with whom Mr. Justice Black concurred, also dissented.'
Mr. Justice Brennan did not take part.'
In the Ciucci case, it was charged that within a matter
of minutes the defendant shot and killed his wife and three
children, and set fire to their house. He was indicted and
tried for the murder of his wife. At the trial evidence of
all four deaths was introduced by the prosecution, and the
defendant was convicted and given a twenty year prison
sentenced to forty-five years in prison. The prosecution
of one of the children, again introducing evidence as to all
of the crimes. This time the defendant was convicted and
sentenced to forty-five years in prison. The prosecution
again indicted and tried the defendant for the murder of
still another of the children, and the defendant was con-
victed and sentenced to death. He appealed, claiming that
the successive trials by the state court was a violation of
due process clause, and that certain inflamatory newspaper
articles which had been circulated between his trials made
it impossible for him to receive a fair trial. The Supreme
Court of Illinois affirmed the conviction." The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari,2 and per curiam,
affirmed the conviction, holding that the successive trials in
the state courts were not a violation of the due process re-
quirement." Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Chief Jus-
tice Warren and Mr. Justice Brennan concurred, dissented.'
o In his dissent, Mr. Justice Douglas said. supra, n. 1, 477, 480:
"Hoag was once made to 'run the gantlet' on whether he was present
when the violence and putting in fear occurred. Having once run that
gantlet successfully, he may not be compelled to run it again."
"°Mr. Justice Brennan was one of the dissenting justices in the state
court trial. State v. Hoag, 21 N.J. 496, 122 A. 2d 628, 633 (1956).
People v. Ciucci, 8 Il1. 2d 619, 137 N.E. 2d 40 (1956).
'353 U.S. 982 (1957).
The Court said, supra n. 2, 573:
"The five members of the Court who join in this opinion are in agree-
ment that upon the record as it stands no violation of due process
has been shown. The State was constitutionally entitled to prosecute
these individual offenses singly at separate trials, and to utilize therein
all relevant evidence, in the absence of proof establishing that such
a course of action entailed fundamental unfairness. . . . MR. JusTIcE
FRANKFURTER and MR. JusTIcE HARLAN, although believing that the
matters set forth in the . . . newspaper articles might, if established,
'require a ruling that fundamental unfairness existed here, concur in
the affirmance of the judgment because this material, not being part
of the record, and not having been considered by the state courts, may
not be considered here."
,Mr. Justice Douglas said, supra, n. 2, dis. op. 573, 575:
"... by using the same evidence in multiple trials the State continued
its relentless prosecutions until it got the result it wanted. It In
effect tried the accused for four murders three consecutive times,
massing in each trial the horrible details of each of the four deaths.
[VOL. XIX
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Mr. Justice Black concurred in the dissent."5
The instant cases present two principal questions: first,
did the state's conduct in either case amount to double
jeopardy, and if so, was it that kind of double jeopardy
as might violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment; secondly, even if double jeopardy was not
present in either case, did the state's re-trials constitute
a violation of the due process clause.
As to the first question, presented more strongly in
the Hoag case, the defendant relied to a very great degree
on the doctrine of collateral estoppel 6 to bar the state from
trying him a second time on the basis of the same evidence
that the state had used at the first trial.17 Collateral estoppel
is a variation of the doctrine of res judicata,s and is closely
related to double jeopardy. The difference between the
two seems to be that while double jeopardy is applicable
to persons, collateral estoppel applies to causes of action."
Hoag's argument ran that since his acquittal at the first
trial had to be based on the belief of the jury that he had
not been present at the scene of the robbery, the state is
estopped from again litigating the issue of his presence.
The state court considered this doctrine, but found that it
was impossible to determine the basis for the jury's ac-
quittal at the first trial, and for this reason the doctrine of
collateral estoppel could not be used as a bar to the second
trial, because the jury may well have based their first
acquittal on another ground. The Supreme Court adopted
This is an unseemly and oppressive use of a criminal trial that violates
the concept of due process contained in the Fourteenth Amendment,
whatever its ultimate scope is taken to be."
1B Mr. Justice Black concurred in the dissent "on the ground that the
Fourteenth Amendment bars a state from placing a defendant twice in
jeopardy for the same offense." Ibid., 575.
18RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS (1942) §68 (1):
"Where a question of fact essential to the judgment is actually litigated
and determined by a valid and final judgment, the determination Is
conclusive between the parties in a subsequent action on a different
cause of action ..... "
17 And see generaly, Comment, Criminal Law-Double Jeopardy and Res
Judicata as Applied to Succe8sive Prosecutions for Offenses Against Mul-
tiple Victims of Robbery [New Jersey], 14 Wash. and Lee L. Rev. 80
(1957). This was a comment on the state court decision in the Hoag
case, supra n. 3, and contains an analysis of the doctrine of collateral
estoppel.
18 Supra, ns. 16-17; and see Scott, Collateral Estoppel By Judgment, 56
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1942).
18 See Lugar, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy And Res Judicata, 39 Iowa
L. Rev. 317, 329 et seq (1954), citing the Maryland Court of Appeals opinion
in State v. Goblentz, 169 Md. 159, 180 A. 266 (1935).
1959]
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this interpretation in affirming the conviction, 20 after point-
ing out that even if the state had been barred by the doc-
trine of collateral estoppel, that there had never been a
determination by the Court that the doctrine was a Con-
stitutional requirement.2' Mr. Chief Justice Warren pointed
out what seems to be a valid objection to this reasoning
in his dissent, saying:
"The only contested issue was whether the petitioner
was one of the robbers. The proof of the elements of
the crime of robbery was overwhelming and was not
challenged. The suggestion that the jury might have
acquitted because of a failure of proof that property
was taken from the victims is simply unrealistic. The
guarantee of a constitutional right should not be denied
by such an artificial approach. The first jury's verdict
of acquittal is merely an illusion of justice if its legal
significance is not a determination that there was at
least a reasonable doubt whether petitioner was pres-
ent at the scene of the robbery."22
According to the weight of authority,23 the majority of
the Court was correct in adopting the state court's con-
struction of its robbery statute,24 and holding that each of
the robberies was a separate offense. This would seem to
preclude any forceful argument that the second trial was
double jeopardy per se; however, it also appears Mr. Chief
Justice Warren's objection to the refusal of the court to
apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel has merit. It must
be remembered that in both of the trials in the Hoag case,
Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 471 (1958). The court said:
"The state court simply ruled that petitioners previous acquittal did
not give rise to such an (collateral) estoppel because 'the trial of the
first three indictments involved several questions, not just [petitioners]
identity, and there is no way of knowing upon which question the
jury's verdict turned.' * * * Possessing no such corrective power over
state courts as we do over the federal courts . . .we would not be
justified in substituting a different view as to the basis of the jury's
verdict." [Parenthetical material supplied].
21Ibid., 471. The court said:
"Despite it's wide employment we entertain grave doubts whether
collateral estoppel can be regarded as a constitutional requirement.
Certainly this Court has never so held."
2 Hoag v. State, 356 U.S. 464 (1958), dis. op. 473, 476.
"While the question is a fairly rare one, in view of the usual procedure
of the state to prosecute for only one offense, a vast majority of the courts
that have passed on the question have held that the robbery of several
persons at the same time constitutes separate offenses. See Comment,
supra, n. 17, 84, fn. 23, and the authorities assembled therein.
N.J.-S.A. 2A, §141-1.
[VOL. XIX
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all of the witnesses testified in exactly the same manner
at the second trial as at the first, and it is difficult to find
a rational basis for the first jury's acquittal if they had
believed that the defendant was present at the scene of the
crimes.
The landmark case in this general area is still Palko v.
Connecticut,25 where the Court held that the second trial
of the defendant for murder was permissible under the
Connecticut statute" allowing the state a right of appeal
in a criminal case. The Court felt that errors in the first
trial, prejudicial to the state, allowed the state to re-try
the defendant without violating the due process clause, and
affirmed the second conviction resulting in the death
sentence.
In Brock v. North Carolina,27 the trial court granted
the state's motion for a mistrial when two of the state's
key witnesses refused to testify at the defendant's trial on
the ground that their testimony would prejudice appeals
that the witnesses had taken from criminal convictions
that had been entered against them. The Supreme Court
affirmed the conviction at the second trial, over the defen-
dant's double jeopardy objection. Outside of these two
cases there is a surprising lack of authority on this precise
point.28
While holding that the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, as applied to the states, does not em-
brace the double jeopardy prohibition of the Fifth Amend-
ment, the Palko case implies that there may be circum-
stances where the repeated jeopardy will be of such char-
acter that it violates the fundamental concepts of liberty
and justice that are implicit in the due process clause. There
Mr. Justice Cardozo said:
"Is that kind of double jeopardy to which the statute
has subjected him a hardship so acute and shocking
that our polity will not endure it? Does it violate
those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political in-
stitutions'? ... The answer surely must be 'no.' What
the answer would have to be if the state were per-
302 U.S. 319 (1937).
0 3 GEN. STATS. CONN. (1949) §8812.
- 344 U.S. 424 (1953).
2 Annotation, 2 L. Ed. 2020 (1958).
1959]
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mitted after a trial free from error to try the accused
over again or to bring another case against him, we
have no occasion to consider."29
Accepting the thesis of Mr. Chief Justice Warren, which
seems to be the more logical approach, a forceful argument
can be made that sustaining Hoag's second conviction by
rejecting the idea of collateral estoppel was the kind of
fundamental unfairness that should be barred by the broad
scope of the due process clause. Following this reasoning,
it would seem that the query of the Palko case has been
partially answered in that after an error free trial in the
state court, the state is free to try a defendant again,
using all the same evidence, as long as the second trial
can be based on a technically separate violation of a stat-
ute. Whether or not the doctrine of collateral estoppel
should be an element of the due process, it would seem
that the Court's refusal to apply the doctrine in the Hoag
case was, as the dissent observed, "artificial".
The second question, i.e. does the state's conduct, in
subjecting a defendant to successive criminal trials based
on substantially the same evidence, constitute a violation
of the due process clause, creates another doubt in the
instant cases, especially in the Ciucci case. The Palko de-
cision sets out the doctrine that a state will not be allowed
to harass a defendant with multiple trials. 0 Upon this rea-
soning there seem to be grounds in the Ciucci case for be-
lieving that this harassment and wearing out was the intent
of the state. Of course the state has a necessarily wide lati-
2OPalko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937). While It might appear
that the Palko and Brock decisions go much further In permitting states
to stage repeated trials than the subject cases, in that in Palko and Brock
the retrials were for the identical offenses involved at the first trial while
the offenses in the subject cases were at least technically separate, such
an appearance is illusory. The subject cases Involve complete and error-
free first trials. Palko's first trial involved errors and produced no final
judgment, the second trial being awarded on the State's appeal. Brock's
first trial was never completed. In such cases of an abortive or error-ridden
first trial, -the second trial is in some circumstances regarded as raising
no problem of jeopardy at all, because jeopardy is not regarded as having
attached at the first proceeding. The circumstances under which jeopardy
is regarded as attaching prior to the termination of the first proceeding
vary from state ,to state. See MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956)
§1.09 and comment.
8 Ibid., 328 where the court said:
"The state is not attempting to wear the accused out by a multitude
of cases with accumulated trials. It asks no more than this, that
the case against him shall go on until there shall be a trial free from
the corrosion of substantial legal error."
[VOL. XIX
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tude in the administration of its own criminal law,31 but
applying the harassment idea of the Palko case to the facts
of the Ciucci case, it appears that the prosecution was un-
willing to accept the verdict and sentence of the first or
second juries, and that the state continued to use the sepa-
rate crimes to obtain the desired result. It seems that
here is a clear situation where the state set out to obtain
the death penalty, and, using the same evidence in all three
trials, finally obtained that end.
If there be a solution to the troublesome problems raised
by the instant cases, it would seem that it must come from
the states.32 The Supreme Court apparently felt that the
desirability of leaving the states free to administer their
own criminal justice was not out-weighed by the argument
in the Hoag case of collateral estoppel, nor in the Ciucci
case by the multiple trials to which the defendant was
subjected. In the application of such an inexact standard
as the due process clause, there are almost certain to be
8 Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 175 (1946) :
"But the Due Process Clause has never been perverted so as to force
upon the forty-eight States a uniform code of criminal procedure. Ex-
cept for the limited scope of the federal criminal code, the prosecu-
tion of crime is a matter for the individual States."
2 One solution offered is that set forth by the MoDEL PENAL. CODn (Tent.
Draft No. 5, 1956). The CoDE sets out the following suggested rules in
§1.08 (2) (3) :
"(2) Requirement of Single Prosecution. Except as provided in para-
graph (3) of this Section, if a person is charged with two or
more offenses and the charges -are known to the proper officer
of the police or prosecution and within the jurisdiction of a
single court, they must be prosecuted in a single prosecution
when:
(a) the offenses are 'based on the same conduct; or
(b) the offenses are based on a series of acts or omissions moti-
vated by a purpose to accomplish a single criminal objec-
tive, and necessary or incidental to the accomplishment of
that objective; or
(c) the offenses are based on a series of acts or omissions moti-
vated by a common purpose or plan and which result in the
repeated commission of the same offense or affect the same
person or the same persons or the same properly thereof.
(3) Relief from Required Joinder. When a person is charged with
two or more offenses, the Court may order any such charge to
be tried separately, if it is satisfied that justice so requires."
It is interesting to note that the original decision in the state court in the
Hoag case is mentioned in the note to §1.08, ibid., p. 35, and is set forth
as the sort of situation that the MODEL PENAL CODE provisions were meant
to correct. The objection to the adoption of provisions of this sort seems
to be that where the state has no right of appeal in a criminal case, its
administration of criminal justice might be hampered because when the
jury acquits the defendant of the multiple charges because of errors com-
mitted at the trial, the state would then have no further proceedings open
to it on any of the charges. However, despite the validity of this objection,
it seems that some manner of uniformity is desirable.
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differences of opinion, not only among writers"3 and indi-
viduals, but also on the Court.
NORMAN E. BURKE
Problems Resulting From Imposing Restrictions On
Subdivided Lots By Straw Man Conveyance
Gnau v. Kinlein'
In 1947, the appellants, Arthur Gnau and his wife, con-
veyed an unimproved eight acre tract of land to a straw
man by deed, reciting that the grantors had subdivided the
tract into 13 lots as shown on a plat filed with and expressly
made a part of the deed. It also stipulated that the entire
tract was to be subject to certain covenants and restric-
tions, including the restriction that the land shall be used
for private residence purposes only. The deed provided
that the covenants and restrictions would be binding on
all of the land, that they were to run with the land, and
be binding on the heirs, personal representatives, successors
or assigns of the parties, and that they should be performed
by and be enforceable by all persons owning, occupying or
having any interest in any of the land.
The straw man immediately reconveyed the entire tract
to the Gnaus subject to the same restrictions. On June 17,
1947, the above mentioned deeds and plat were duly re-
corded among the Land Records of Baltimore County. On
June 21 the Gnaus conveyed lot 9 on the plat by a deed
which neither included nor made reference to any of the
restrictive covenants. In 1954 the Gnaus repurchased lot
9 by a deed which made no mention of the covenants. In
1949 the Gnaus sold lots 1 and 2, but the deed contained
no covenants nor reference thereto. Shortly thereafter,
lots 7 and 8 were conveyed by a deed which provided that
these lots were to be held subject to the restrictive coy-
=There were two law review articles written on the Hoag case after
it had been decided in the state court, and the writers disagreed in their
conclusions. See Comment, supra, n. 17, 88 where the writer says:
"One reason, if not on authority, it seems . . . the defense of double
jeopardy should have been upheld in the principal case."
Of., Note, 25 Fordham L. Rev. 531, 535 (1956) where the writer said:
"The instant decision would appear to be sound." And also see note. Con-
stitutional Law - Successive Prosecutions of Same Defendant by State for
Crimes Arising Out of Same Occurrence Do Not Violate Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 107 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 109 (1958), where the writer severely criticizes
the decision in the Ciucci case.
' 217 Md. 43, 141 A. 2d 492 (1958).
[VOL. XIX
